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     Abstract 
This paper examines policy effectiveness as a function of leader identity. We experimentally vary leader 
religious identity in a coordination game implemented in India, and focus upon citizen reactions to 
leader identity, controlling for leader actions. We find that minority leaders improve coordination, 
while majority leaders do not. Alternative treatment arms reveal that affirmative action for minorities 
reverses this result, while intergroup contact improves the effectiveness of leaders of both identities. 
We also find that minority leaders are less effective in towns with a history of intergroup conflict. Our 
results demonstrate that leader and policy effectiveness depend upon citizen reactions, conditioned 
by social identity and past conflict. 
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1. Introduction 
We examine the role of leader identity in influencing economic outcomes and policy effectiveness 
in societies marked by social diversity.  In a sharp departure from previous work on leader identity 
that focuses upon leader preferences and actions, we use a field experiment to isolate the role of citizen 
reactions. We find that citizen reactions to a leader’s social identity can significantly impact social 
outcomes, over and above any direct effect of the leader’s actions. Specifically, leaders belonging to 
the religious minority achieve greater group coordination. This is because individual (citizen) choices 
respond not only to economic payoffs but also to leader identity, minority citizens are more responsive 
to leader identity than majority group citizens, and majority group citizens anticipate this. So identity 
moderates behavior and, once coordination is involved, beliefs over the behavior of other members 
of the group matter. We extend the analysis by randomizing two policy treatments designed to 
improve social integration, namely affirmative action and intergroup contact. We find that these policy 
treatments modify citizen reactions to leader identity and play a significant role in determining their 
effectiveness. By virtue of conducting the experiment in areas with varying levels of previous 
intergroup conflict, we further identify a role for the history of intergroup conflict in shaping the 
effectiveness of minority group leaders.  
The main outcome we investigate is economic coordination. Coordination is distinct from 
cooperation as measured, say, in public goods games. Cooperation relies on voluntary contributions 
by individuals, driven by prosocial motivations such as altruism or trust, or specific strategies such as 
conditional cooperation. Coordination, on the other hand, relies on individually rational (self-
interested) choices to collectively act to achieve a common goal, which may or may not result in 
Pareto-superior outcomes. Coordination can be critical to resolving collective action problems and 
market failures. It has been shown to be important for conflict prevention, halting the transmission 
of viruses, changing social norms, escaping poverty traps, optimizing resource use on common land, 
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and raising the provision of public goods (Schelling, 1980; Coleman, 1987; Kremer, 1993; Hoff, 2000; 
Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001; Adda, 2016; Bowles and Halliday, 2020). Global public goods are often 
characterized as having weakest-link properties and thereby being susceptible to coordination failure 
(Sandler, 1998; Nordhaus, 2006). Coordination failure as a barrier to economic development is 
highlighted in the field work of Dreze and Gazdar (1997) and Dreze and Sharma (1998) in the Indian 
state of Uttar Pradesh, the site of our study. They observe, for instance, that villages fail to coordinate 
on simple tasks of community value such as sanitation or the timing of the planting of crops to 
maximize output, with severe welfare consequences. While coordination problems are rife in most 
societies, they are of particular importance in developing countries where formal institutions to 
coordinate individual actions are weak and externalities from infectious disease or pollution are large.  
In this study we make a unique contribution by connecting the literature on politician identity and 
policy outcomes with the literature on leadership and coordination, by introducing the relevance of 
social identity in achieving coordination. Our identification of citizen reactions as a new mechanism 
by which leader identity influences policy outcomes is relevant to understanding the effectiveness of 
leaders, and the conditions for the success of policies aimed at helping minority groups such as 
affirmative action or improving intergroup interaction via residential desegregation or mobility policies 
like Moving to Opportunity in the United States. We also highlight that the success of identity-based 
policies will vary with the history of conflict between the two groups, a result that is relevant to many 
post-conflict settings. 
We implement a large laboratory-style experiment in a field setting in India, and experimentally 
vary the religious identity of the leader. Addressing this research question with observational data is 
difficult for several reasons. First, leader identity is typically not randomly assigned and will tend to be 
correlated with citizen preferences. Second, with observational data there is no straightforward way 
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of disentangling the effects of leader preferences from those of citizen reactions. Third, it can be 
difficult to obtain secondary data on coordination outcomes. 
We use a weakest link coordination game (as in Brandts and Cooper, 2006), a key feature of which 
is that an individual’s payoff depends positively upon the minimum effort in the group and negatively 
on their own effort. This game has multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Coordination is measured as the 
minimum level of effort achieved in the group. Payoffs are designed such that coordination tends to 
occur at the lowest effort level, in a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium. Leaders can potentially affect a shift 
to a better equilibrium by proposing a (non-binding) effort level. We conducted this coordination 
game with 1028 participants in mixed-religion groups, across 44 towns in India’s largest state of Uttar 
Pradesh. Our sample includes Muslims, who are a religious minority in India, and Hindus who form 
the religious majority.   
To guide interpretation of our findings, we develop a stylized theoretical framework that allows 
for two types of individuals--rational types, who simply maximize their economic payoff in the game 
and behavioral types, who additionally respond to leader identity. The model predicts that minimum 
group effort will vary with leader identity if the expected fraction of behavioral types differs by citizen 
identity. In particular, individual choices are guided by beliefs about how others will respond to leader 
identity. For instance, in choosing their actions, Hindus not only directly respond to leader identity, 
they also account for how they think Muslims will respond to leader identity. If population minorities 
are expected to be more responsive to leader identity, the expected fraction of Muslim behavioral 
types will be higher than the expected fraction of Hindu behavioral types, and minimum group effort 
(and hence coordination) will be higher under Muslim leaders than under Hindu leaders.      
Our main finding is that the introduction of Muslim leaders increases minimum group effort by 
31%, coordinating group outcomes to a Pareto-superior equilibrium, while the introduction of Hindu 
leaders has no significant impact on coordination. This result is robust to the inclusion of town fixed 
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effects and to several specification checks. This novel finding identifies a potential gain in aggregate 
output associated with having minority leaders and establishes the relevance of social identity to 
coordination outcomes. 
Investigating mechanisms, we show, consistent with our theoretical framework, that behavior is 
primarily driven by citizen reactions. In particular, it is shaped by Muslims having stronger in-group 
bias and Hindus expecting this to be the case, with in-group bias being primed by leader identity. We 
rule out other possibilities: we establish that higher coordination under Muslim leaders does not arise 
from their proposing higher effort (a proxy for leader preferences), from a perception that Muslims 
are more competent leaders, or a perception that Muslim leaders themselves supply higher effort.  
The results discussed thus far describe reactions to leader identity in the control arm. We now 
discuss the influence of leader identity on coordination outcomes in the two treatment arms, offering 
the first analysis of affirmative action and intergroup contact in the same experimental setting. Towns 
were randomly assigned to either treatment or control arms, and within each town, we randomly 
assigned some groups to have Muslim leaders and others to have Hindu leaders. This experimental 
design allows us to identify whether the stronger coordination under a Muslim leader that we 
documented in the control arm is modified after affirmative action or intergroup contact is introduced. 
We also stratify by the intensity of recent religious conflict.  
Under the affirmative action (AA) treatment, the main result is reversed: we now find that 
coordination improves under Hindu but not Muslim leaders. This is consistent with the treatment 
making salient for the Hindu majority that the Muslim minority is being favored by design, thereby 
priming Hindu identity. We verify this by showing that individual effort levels of Hindus increase 
under Hindu relative to Muslims leaders. This result demonstrates how identity-based policies modify 
citizen reactions to leader identity.  
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We facilitated intergroup contact by having mixed-identity groups collaborate in solving a puzzle 
before the coordination game was played. We find that this improves coordination in groups led by 
leaders of both religions, but with Hindu-led groups showing a significantly larger improvement. 
Indeed, this effect serves to counter-balance the control group difference so that, following intergroup 
contact, Hindu and Muslim leaders achieve similar levels of coordination. This is consistent with 
contact leading to an increase in the fraction of Hindu and Muslim behavioral types. In other words, 
identity becomes salient after contact with a member of the other religion, and more so among 
majority group members. This is consistent with majority group members having more limited 
exposure to minorities in a pre-treatment setting.  
We re-estimated the impact of leader identity in the control group and in the two policy arms of 
the experiment, distinguishing towns in neighboring districts with a high vs low intensity of Hindu-
Muslim conflict in the preceding thirty years. We compare coordination across arms within each 
district, so that district-specific unobservable characteristics do not contaminate our findings. We find 
that a history of intergroup conflict has a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of minority (Muslim) 
leaders under all policy regimes. Specifically, AA decreases Muslim leader effectiveness significantly in 
high conflict areas and intergroup contact increases Muslim leader effectiveness only in low conflict 
areas. In contrast, conflict history does not significantly influence Hindu leader effectiveness. 
Our findings are relevant to research in several areas that are currently distinct from one another, 
including leader identity, coordination, quotas, intergroup contact and social or identity-related 
motivations for economic choices. Previous work on leader identity typically identifies the combined 
impact of leader preferences (or actions) and citizen reactions.1 Our experimental design uniquely 
 
1 Many papers have examined the impact of a politician’s personal identity (e.g. gender, ethnicity, caste) 
on policy outcomes. See, among others, Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Chin and Prakash, 2011; 
Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Brollo and Troiano, 2016; and Bhavnani, 2017. Citizen-candidate 
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allows us to isolate citizen reactions, and we find that they are a very important determinant of leader 
effectiveness. Prior work has tended to focus on whether leaders redistribute public goods or transfers 
towards their own group (Pande, 2003; Burgess et al., 2015), while our focus on coordination provides 
a measure of the aggregate economic impact of leader identity. Further, our study reveals that citizen 
reactions to leader identity can be changed by commonly implemented policies such as AA or 
intergroup contact, with important implications for the success of these policies. No previous work 
has investigated the effectiveness of these policies as a function of leader identity. Finally, we 
contribute novel evidence on the relevance of conflict history, a marker of intergroup hostility, in 
shaping the effectiveness of leaders and of policies.2 Overall, our work pushes forward the frontier on 
the open question of what makes some leaders more effective than others (Brandts et al., 2007; 
Brandts et al., 2015; Weber et al., 2001).   
Our study also takes forward the experimental literature on coordination failure. While previous 
laboratory experimental evidence suggests that leaders are effective in improving economic outcomes 
(Guth et al., 2007; Levy et al., 2011; Brandts et al., 2015; Jack and Recalde, 2015; Brandts et al., 2016; 
Heursen et al., 2019),3 our results make clear that such effects are significantly mediated by social 
identity in diverse societies. Previous research has not examined how the effectiveness of leaders may 
be modified by policies designed to assimilate minorities or promote minority group representation. 
Previous leader-coordination studies have almost entirely been conducted in the laboratory, while the 
few examples of coordination games in the field have not studied the role of leaders (Brooks et al., 
2018; Afridi et al., 2020; Polania-Reyes and Echeverry, 2020). Our implementation of the coordination 
 
models (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997) allow leader identity to affect policy 
outcomes, in contrast to Downsian models where only the identity of the median voter matters. 
2 Previous research primarily focuses on the origins of conflict (see Blattman and Miguel, 2010, for a 
review) and its impact on growth (Rodrick, 1999), credit markets (Fisman et al., 2020), human capital 
(Miguel and Roland, 2011) and cooperation (see Bauer et al., 2016 for a review). 
3 See Hogg (2001) for a theoretical analysis and Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for a literature survey.  
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game in the field enables us to use real social identities rather than lab-assigned identities, to conduct 
the analysis in a developing country where strong formal institutions to enable coordination are less 
present, and to investigate how past conflict influences group behavior. 
We contribute to the literature on AA policies, where there is no previous evidence on how citizens 
react to AA under leaders of different religious or ethnic identities; the existing literature has been 
dominated by the analysis of gender quotas.4 Of particular interest here are Gangadharan et al. (2016) 
and Bagues et al. (2017), who find that male identity is strengthened by gender quotas and committee-
level exposure to women respectively, a result similar to our finding that Hindu identity is primed by 
quotas for Muslim leaders and by intergroup contact with Muslims. Similarly, no previous paper has 
analyzed the effectiveness of intergroup contact in improving coordination, nor how this varies with 
leader identity (and conflict history). The previous literature on intergroup contact finds that contact 
can change attitudes and prejudice towards the out-group, as documented for anti-Muslim prejudice 
in India (Barnhardt, 2009).5 We differ from this literature by measuring group coordination outcomes 
rather than individual attitudes; note that such coordination takes into account others’ actions and 
attitudes. The question of whether the social identity of leaders matters, and how affirmative action 
or intergroup contact policies play out is interesting not only in the Hindu-Muslim setting (which is 
 
4 Many papers have examined how gender quotas influence policy outcomes, gender norms, women’s 
aspirations and political participation (see, among others, Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Beaman et al., 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Beaman et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 2012; 
Matsa and Miller, 2013). Experimental research has primarily focused on whether gender quotas 
encourage women to take part in tournaments (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013; 
Leibbrandt et al., forthcoming). 
5 See Allport (1954) for an articulation of the potential effects of intergroup contact, and Paluck et al. 
(2018) for a review of the empirical literature, as well as Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), Ashraf and 
Bandiera (2017) and Bertrand and Duflo (2017). Only a few recent studies use random assignment of 
groups to examine intergroup contact in a developing country setting (Corno et al., 2018; Lowe, 2017; 
Rao, 2019; Scacco and Warren, 2018). Bhavnani et al. (2014) study the effects of intergroup contact 
on violence in Jerusalem using observational data.  
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about a seventh of the world population), but also in many other societies where progress is held back 
by societal divisions. 
Finally, we contribute to research in psychology, sociology and economics showing that social 
identity affects individual economic choices, and that the influence of identity on behavior varies with 
primes that make group identity salient (see, among others, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Benjamin et 
al., 2016; Hungerman, 2014; Chen and Chen, 2011). We differ from this literature by studying group 
outcomes rather than individual economic choices, and by using real identities rather than laboratory-
primed ones. Further, no previous study has sought to trace the manner in which variation in leader 
identity activates the group identity of citizens and, thereby, the degree of coordination failure under 
alternative policy regimes. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides contextual 
information on religion and leadership in India. Section 3 describes the data collection and Section 4 
delineates the experimental design. Section 5 lays out a theoretical framework to structure and interpret 
our results, Sections 6 and 7 present the empirical results, and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Context: Religion and Leadership in India 
India is a religiously diverse country, with Hindus constituting the majority religion (79.8% of the 
population in the 2011 census), Muslims forming the largest religious minority (14.2% of the 
population) and the rest being comprised of Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists and others. With 172 
million Muslims in 2011, India has the third largest Muslim population in the world. Close to 40% of 
Muslims live in urban areas relative to 29% of Hindus. The standard of living of Muslims is generally 
lower than that of Hindus: 43% of Muslims are illiterate relative to 36% for Hindus, 33% of Muslims 
are employed relative to 41% for Hindus and 25% of Muslims fall below the poverty line compared 
to 22% for all Indian citizens (NITI Aayog, 2016).  
Violence between Hindus and Muslims has occurred frequently in India generating insecurity, 
displacement, segregation and loss of property and life. Previous research indicates that violence tends 
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to disproportionately impact Muslims (Mitra and Ray, 2014). For instance, between 1985 and 1987, in 
the ten states with significant Muslim populations, Muslims experienced 60% of all deaths related to 
religious riots, 45% of all injuries and 73% of property damage (Wilkinson, 2004, p 30). Previous 
research has shown that Muslims (and Hindus) exhibit positive in-group bias in trusting behavior 
when they form a minority of the population, and that such in-group bias is increased by the degree 
of identification with the group (Gupta et al., 2018). In Indian elections (where Muslims form a 
minority of voters), Muslims are more likely to vote for Muslim candidates, but there is no evidence 
that Hindus discriminate against Muslim candidates (Heath et al., 2015). 
Compared to their population share, Muslims are under-represented in leadership positions: 
Muslims comprised only 7.6% of state legislators over the period 1980-2010 (Bhalotra et al., 2014), 
less than 3% of national ministers (The Economist, 2016), and only 4% of the police force and the 
judiciary (Jaffrelot et al., 2019).  This low representation has substantive consequences, since the 
religious identity of politicians has been shown to matter for policy outcomes such as health, education 
and sex-selective abortions (Bhalotra et al., 2014; Bhalotra et al., 2019). There are no quotas for 
Muslims in central government positions. However, some quotas for Muslims have been implemented 
in the civil service and educational institutions in five states (Government of India, 2014).  
3. Site Selection and Subject Recruitment 
We conducted field work was in two pairs of neighboring districts in Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest 
state with more than 200 million inhabitants. Each district pair was composed of one high conflict 
and one low conflict district. The experiment was conducted in 44 towns in July 2017 with 1028 
subjects. We focus on towns rather than villages, as Muslims are more likely to live in urban areas. 
This has the added benefit of comprising a more educated populace, reducing issues surrounding the 
understanding of the experimental tasks.   
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The 44 sites were randomly assigned to three different treatment arms: 14 sites were retained as 
control, and 15 each were assigned to the intergroup contact and the affirmative action treatments 
(see Appendix Table A1). The assignment was performed within each district (i.e. implicitly stratifying 
by high/low conflict status); we further stratified by Muslim population proportion and total 
population. Our research assistants then recruited study participants from both Hindu and Muslim 
sections of each town (see Appendix B1 for further details on site selection and subject recruitment).  
Upon arrival, participant names were recorded on a participant list that was not visible to other 
participants. In India, it is relatively easy to identity Muslims from their names; our research assistants 
were easily able to recruit an equal number of Hindus and Muslims from the list to participate in the 
study. Participant religion was verified using the pre-experiment questionnaire (see below). There were 
only two misclassifications of religion based on name (these participants were compensated and 
replaced with others prior to the experiment). The selected individuals were assigned an ID number, 
assembled in a room and randomly seated on mats, with four participants and a research assistant on 
each mat (see Appendix Figure A2). Subject ID numbers were never matched with participant names, 
and the list of participant names were destroyed at the end of each session. Participants were given no 
information about the identities of other participants in the experiment. 
4. Experimental Design  
Each experimental session contained a pre-experiment survey and three tasks: a puzzle task, a 
weakest link coordination task (run across six rounds), and a social norms elicitation task. Out of the 
three tasks, one was chosen randomly for payment. The average payoff was ₹ 610 including a ₹ 200 
show up fee. This constitutes about 2.5 days’ wage for a semi-skilled laborer. The session concluded 
with a survey of attitudes and respondent characteristics. Subjects knew that the session had multiple 
stages but were not given instructions about any particular stage until reaching that stage (see 
Appendix B2 for complete experiment instructions). 
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4.1. Pre-Experiment Survey and Puzzle Task. Prior to commencement of the incentivized tasks, 
subjects answered a brief survey about their personal characteristics, namely height, eye color, hair 
color and religion. The questionnaire was primarily designed to check the religion of the participant 
(see layout in Appendix B2), and other questions were included to avoid making the research question 
explicitly salient, which might induce socially desirable response bias or experimenter demand effects. 
Using surveys and lists to make identity implicitly salient without making it explicitly salient is standard 
procedure in the identity salience literature (Steele and Aronson, 1995; Shih et al., 1999; Benjamin et 
al., 2016; Cohn et al., 2015). While it is difficult to know how participant responses would change if 
they were explicitly aware that the experiment was about religion, we should note that all subjects filled 
out the same questionnaire. So, even if the questionnaire made the religious focus of our research 
explicitly salient, this would be the same across different types of leaders or different policy arms. 
After the pre-experiment survey, all subjects participated in a 12-piece jigsaw puzzle task. 
Participants completed the task individually in the control and affirmative action treatment groups, 
and in pairs in the intergroup contact treatment group. Our objective was to suppress competitiveness 
and have cooperative intergroup contact, since the latter has been shown to reduce prejudice (Paluck 
et al., 2018; Lowe, 2017). The time given for the puzzle assembly was twelve minutes and almost all 
participants were able to complete the task successfully in this time.  
4.2. Weakest Link Coordination Task. The task structure is closely related to the minimum effort 
corporate turnaround game designed by Brandts et al. (2006), which is based on the minimum effort 
or weakest link coordination game of Van Huyck et al. (1990).6 It was conducted after the puzzle task.  
 
6 Coordination is different from cooperation, as typically usually measured by the willingness to 
contribute in a standard public goods game. In the latter, payoffs depend on the sum of other players’ 
contributions and there is only one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Non-zero contributions in public 
goods games can be related to altruism, trust or other prosocial motivations, and the leader’s role can 
be thought of as encouraging such motivations. In the “weakest link” coordination game, by contrast, 
there are multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked, non-zero effort is 
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4.2.1. Group Formation. Individuals were assigned to four-member groups (each called a “firm”), 
comprised of two Hindu and two Muslim “employees.” Participants did not know, nor could they 
observe, who the other three in their group were. We did not provide information to participants on 
the identity of their group members, and they were explicitly told that the people sitting on their mat 
were not part of their firm.  
4.2.2. Effort Choices and Payoffs. The task is run across six periods. In each period employees decide 
how many hours (x) to devote to firm activities. Their choices vary between 0 and 20 in intervals of 
5: 𝑥! ∈ {0,5,10,15,20}. It is noteworthy that choices are not actual hours worked but effort choices 
with payoff consequences. Employees’ payoffs for each period depend negatively on their own effort 
choice and positively on the minimum effort of all individuals in the group:  
(1) pi = 500 – 25xi + [min (xi, X-i) * 40] 
where xi is player i’s own effort (number of hours) and X-i is the vector of all other players’ effort 
choices. The payoff table is illustrated in Appendix Table A3, where the units are Indian rupees (1USD 
≈ ₹68). Participants were shown the payoff table but not the payoff equation. Under this payoff 
structure, coordinating on any of the available effort levels is a Nash equilibrium.  
Note that it is only worthwhile for profit maximizing employees to raise their own effort level if 
this will increase the minimum effort of the firm.7 Given this, previous work has found that play often 
evolves towards the payoff-dominated equilibrium in which all players choose the lowest possible 
effort level (Brandts et al., 2006). The task is split into two stages. The first stage repeats the 
coordination game described above across four periods (rounds). Employees work in the same firm 
 
individually rational and the leader’s role is to act as a focal point to guide the group towards a specific 
equilibrium. 
7 For a profit maximizing employee to increase their effort by 1 unit, for example, from 0 to 5 hours, 
they must believe there is an 85.5% probability that each of the other three employees increase their 
effort. To derive this probability, we solve for p where 500 = 375(1 − 𝑝") + 575(𝑝"). 
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across all periods. At the end of each period subjects are informed of the firm’s minimum effort. 
Employees are never informed of individual firm members’ effort choices. The first stage is designed 
to induce coordination on an inefficient equilibrium with low levels of effort, which we label 
“coordination failure” (Brandts et al., 2015).  
4.2.3. Leader Assignment. The second stage introduces a leader, and runs for two further periods. The 
leader’s role within each firm is to suggest a non-binding number of hours to work. Leaders do not 
have the scope to communicate with their employees beyond proposing an effort level, similar to 
other papers in the “leading by example” literature (Güth et al., 2007, Gächter et al., 2012; Levy et al., 
2011). All leaders are appointed and participants cannot elect or change the leader. Firm employees 
are informed of the leader’s proposal, but not the actual effort choice of the leader. Employees are 
also provided information about the characteristics of their firm leader taken from the pre-experiment 
survey, namely height, eye color, hair color and religion. The only characteristic that varies across 
leaders is their religion.  
Half of the firms in each session are assigned Hindu leaders and half are assigned Muslim leaders. 
Leader identity is randomly allocated, and the player in each group who will be the leader is also 
randomly selected conditional on their religion. Our estimates for the impact of introducing a leader 
are thus specific to leader identity. It is important to remember that the religious composition of firms 
is the same across all firms, regardless of the leader’s religion. Participant characteristics with regard 
to demographics, education, income and religiosity are balanced across groups with Hindu or Muslim 
leaders (Appendix Table A4). Leader characteristics other than religion, in particular, gender, age, and 
family income are balanced across Hindu and Muslim leaders, though Muslim leaders are less likely to 
have gone to college and more likely to pray several times a day, similar to the overall population.  
After being informed of the leader’s effort proposal and leader characteristics at the start of the 
fifth period, similar to the earlier periods, employees are informed of their group’s minimum effort in 
 14 
the previous period. All employees including the leader must then decide how many hours to work. 
The leader’s effort, just like the effort of other employees, is not visible to the group. The coordination 
game is repeated for two periods with the same leader, but with a new effort proposal by the leader in 
each period.  If this task is selected for payment, players are paid their coordination game payoffs from 
two randomly selected periods. We have two additional treatment arms (described below) where the 
same weakest link game is played, but with changes to the environment in which the leaders operate, 
designed to mimic commonly proposed policy interventions.  
4.2.4. Affirmative Action (AA) Treatment. Affirmative action policies, such as quotas, are common in 
both government and business to increase participation of disadvantaged or minority groups. As 
described earlier, 15 of our 44 towns were randomly assigned into an AA treatment arm. The game is 
conducted exactly as in the control arm described above, with one important exception. Upon the 
introduction of a leader at the beginning of period 5, subjects are told that “similar to many 
government positions, 50% of the leadership positions in this game will be reserved. Reservation will 
be made based on some characteristic in the initial survey.”  
Along with information on the leader’s characteristics (height, eye color, hair color, religion), 
employees with a Muslim (Hindu) leader are also informed that their leader is in a reserved 
(unreserved) position.8 While participants are not explicitly told that the reservation is based on 
religion, about 70% of respondents in the post-experiment survey correctly identified that the 
reservation was done on the basis of religion, with the rest citing other leader characteristics or saying 
“don’t know.”9 It is important to reiterate that here, as in the control arm, by design all groups contain 
 
8 Leadership positions could in theory also be reserved for Hindus. However, we do not analyse this 
possibility since we are not aware of the existence of such a policy in any part of India.  
9 Our estimates, which are intent-to-treat estimates, will therefore under-estimate the impact of 
religion-based reservation. Sample size considerations precluded the inclusion of a treatment with 
Hindu leaders being reserved and, in practice, quotas are usually for population minority groups. 
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two Hindu and two Muslim participants. By comparing the control and the AA treatment arms (and 
thus effectively comparing a Muslim leader with a Muslim leader who is leading through a quota), we 
can measure whether people behave differently when they believe their leader is in a position due to 
an affirmative action policy. In our setting, AA does not change the composition of leaders, it only 
makes the reservation policy salient in participants’ minds.  
4.2.5. Intergroup Contact Treatment. We also investigate the impact of a randomized intervention 
that increases intergroup contact on citizen responses to leaders of different religious identity.  The 
key difference between this treatment and the control arm is the implementation of the puzzle task. 
Unlike in the control arm and AA treatment, where puzzles are assembled individually, subjects in the 
contact treatment assemble the jigsaw puzzle with a partner from the other religion. The puzzle 
partner is a person sitting on the same mat as the participant, and therefore not a member of the same 
firm (see Appendix Figure A3). Subjects are encouraged to talk with their partner during the 12 
minutes allowed for the puzzle. By comparing outcomes across the control arm and the contact 
treatment arm, we can infer the impact of intergroup contact on the ability of leaders to coordinate 
groups. 
Subjects in the sample towns often live in separate Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods, which limits 
interaction between the two communities. Nevertheless, our survey confirms that only 14% of 
participants incorrectly identified the religion of their puzzle partner.  A potential concern is that 
interacting with anyone, not necessarily from a different religion, prior to the coordination game may 
affect coordination. As we shall see below, we can reject this concern because we see no differences 
in minimum effort in the contact vs the control arms in the periods before the leader is introduced. 
4.3. Norms Elicitation Task 
To measure Hindu and Muslim religious norms we follow Krupka and Weber (2013) and 
Gangadharan et al. (2016) and conduct a social norms coordination task. Participants in this task are 
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asked a set of questions related to behavior in the weakest link coordination task. Participants are 
asked to rate the social appropriateness of a Hindu or Muslim employee working 0, 10 or 20 hours 
under a Hindu or Muslim leader. Appropriateness ratings are measured on a 4-point ordered scale, 
consisting of the following options: very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, 
somewhat socially appropriate and very socially appropriate. These questions can thus be used to 
evaluate what people within our sample towns believe are the appropriate behaviors between Muslims 
and Hindus.   
5. Theoretical Framework  
In order to explain our results, we describe a stylized theoretical framework to help us understand 
the role of leader identity in changing individual behavior and hence the group outcome in the 
coordination game. Specifically, our model incorporates the role of citizen reactions to leader identity 
in shaping aggregate outcomes. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced the role of identity in 
economic decision making. In a setting broadly related to ours, Benjamin et al (2016) show that 
priming religious identity can change individual economic choices, but utility maximization in their 
model does not involve strategic interactions as in our coordination game. We build on an extensive 
reputational literature by introducing “behavioral types”—players who choose their effort based not 
only on their economic payoff but also on leader identity. Rational players, in contrast, maximize their 
payoff, taking into account the presence of behavioral types. As is standard in the reputational 
literature, we assume that behavioral types constitute only a tiny fraction of the population.  
 Recall that individuals in our field experiment are either Hindus or Muslims, and four players are 
randomly chosen from the population to constitute a group. Individuals do not know the identity or 
religion of other individuals in their group. The group plays the coordination game as described earlier, 
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with individuals choosing among possible effort choices over a continuum [0,W].10 All players selecting 
any effort level in this range produces a Nash equilibrium. We assume that in situations where there 
is no leader, all individuals will use the concept of risk-dominance as an equilibrium selection device in 
the coordination game. This means that players have uniform beliefs over the others’ effort strategies 
and that this guides their own effort choice. This assumption is similar to that made in coordination 
games with investment decisions under incomplete information.11 The coordination game payoff is 
maximized when the individual player matches the minimum effort of the other players. So, the 
optimal effort choice involves calculating the expected value of the minimum of the other three 
players. Under the risk-dominant criterion, players assume that all the other players are randomizing 
uniformly over [0,𝑊], and hence the equilibrium effort choice can be calculated as 𝑥∗ = $
%
. 
The optimization is different for behavioral individuals.  Behavioral individuals will follow the 
leader’s proposal if the leader is from their own religion and will choose effort level 𝑥∗	when the leader 
is from the other religion. We assume that the leader’s proposal will be greater than the minimum 
effort in the no-leader equilibrium 𝑥∗, indeed we show that this is the case.12 Rational players will 
choose an effort level that optimizes their coordination game payoffs, keeping the responses of 
behavioral types in mind. A fraction 𝑎& of Hindu individuals are behavioral types, as are a fraction 
𝑎' among Muslims. The overall fraction of behavioral types in the population is thus 𝑎9 ≔ 𝑝𝑎' +
(1 − 𝑝)𝑎& , where 𝑝 is the population share of Muslims. 𝑎& 	and	𝑎' are small enough that the 
 
10 In our experiment, we have discrete effort choices for ease of implementation in the field.  
11 See the literature on equilibrium selection and global games e.g. Carlsson and van Damme (1993), 
Morris and Shin (1998) and Morris, Shin and Yildiz (2016), among others. 
12 This is true in our data: less than 2% of all leader proposals in rounds 5 and 6 are lower than the 
minimum group effort in round 4 (prior to leader identity being announced). 
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probability of more than one behavioral individual in a group of 3 or 4 is close to zero, so that rational 
players can behave as though there is at most one behavioral player in the rest of the group.13 
The optimal effort choices for a rational player when there is a Hindu leader (𝑥&), and when there 
is a Muslim leader (𝑥'), can then be derived as follows:  
(2)																𝑥& = (1 − 𝑎9)"𝑥∗ + 3(1 − 𝑎9)( >(1 − 𝑝)𝑎&
$
"
+ 𝑝𝑎'𝑥∗∗?   
(3)																𝑥' = (1 − 𝑎9)"𝑥∗ + 3(1 − 𝑎9)( @𝑝𝑎'
$
"
+ (1 − 𝑝)𝑎&𝑥∗∗A  
Here the first term reflects the probability of all three other players being rational (and the optimal 
choice is therefore 𝑥∗); the second term is the expected optimal choice under the assumption of one 
player in the group being behavioral. Under Hindu leaders, if the behavioral player is Hindu (which 
happens with probability (1 − 𝑝)𝑎&), that player will follow the leader and choose effort above 𝑥∗, 
and hence the rational player only needs to match the expected minimum effort of the other two 
rational players, which is $
"
	(> 𝑥∗). On the other hand, if the behavioral player is Muslim (which 
happens with probability 𝑝𝑎'), that player chooses 𝑥∗.	Then the rational player needs to match the 











< 𝑥∗. A similar logic applies to computation of 𝑥' . 
Examination of equations (2) and (3) tells us that optimal effort in the presence of a leader will 
be higher than the optimal effort without a leader only under certain conditions, and that the change 
in optimal effort will depend on the identity of the leader as well as the fraction of behavioral 
individuals in each religion. This is a contribution we make to the coordination literature that typically 
overlooks social diversity within groups.  
 
13 For instance, if 𝑎9 is 0.10, then the probability of more than one behavioural player is only 5.23% in 
a group of size 4, and 2.8% in a group of size 3. If 𝑎9 is 0.05, these probabilities are 1.4% and 0.7% 
respectively.  
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We can be more specific in our predictions: as long as 𝑝𝑎' 	is sufficiently greater than 
(1 − 𝑝)𝑎& , minimum group effort will be higher under Muslim leaders after leader identity is made 
public, and the increase in minimum group effort under Muslim leaders (compared to the situation 
without a leader) will be greater than the increase in minimum group effort under Hindu leaders. Note 
that one way this sufficient condition is satisfied is if the fraction of behavioral types among Muslims 
(𝑎')	is much greater than the fraction among Hindus (𝑎&). This is likely to be the case, since previous 
literature has established that members of population minority groups are more likely to display “in-
group bias” and majority groups are unlikely to do so (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Gupta et al, 2018; 
Berge et al., 2019). We now proceed to test these hypotheses using the data from our field experiment. 
6. The Impact of Leader Identity on Coordination Outcomes 
6.1. Regression Specification 
Our main outcome variable is the minimum effort exerted in the group in each round. This is the 
key determinant of player payoffs and is the standard measure of coordination in the weakest link 
literature. We test whether leaders improve coordination by estimating the following specification: 
(4)   𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡-./ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./ + 𝐺-.0 𝛾 + 𝜀-./ ; t=1,2,…6 
where MinGroupEffortkjt is the minimum effort exerted by group k in town j in period t, and Leaderkjt is 
a dummy variable that takes value one for periods 5 and 6, when a leader is introduced. This regression 
therefore compares the group’s minimum effort in periods with a leader to periods without a leader. 
Gkj is a suite of control variables that includes town fixed effects, demographic controls (average age, 
education, gender mix and monthly household income of the group members) and a control for 
religiosity based on prayer frequency. Standard errors are clustered at the group level to account for 
within-group correlation in outcomes across different periods.  
We run specification (4) separately for Hindu and Muslim leaders to test whether leader identity 
matters in achieving better coordination. Since comparisons between later and earlier rounds maybe 
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influenced by round effects and because our main interest is in the comparison between Hindu and 
Muslims (where pre-leader rounds have similar rates of coordination) we also run a regression on the 
combined data, and include an interaction term 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./ ∗ 𝑀𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑖𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./ in order to test 
whether the increase in minimum effort under Muslim leaders is higher than under Hindu leaders. 
Recall that half of all groups within each town are randomly assigned to have Muslim leaders. We also 
run a robustness test in which we restrict the analysis to periods 5 and 6, and control for the group-
specific minimum effort in period 4 and the leader’s proposals in periods 5 and 6. This enables us to 
test whether the impact of the policies can be attributed to differences in the leader’s proposal, or to 
differences across groups in the coordination outcome in previous rounds.  
6.2. Leader Identity and Coordination in the Control Group 
Consistent with the corporate turnaround game literature, we find that groups coordinate on the 
low-effort equilibrium in the absence of a leader, which we call “coordination failure.” The average 
minimum group effort is less than three hours at the end of period 4 (Figure 1A). We find that 
introducing Muslim leaders significantly improves minimum group effort in periods 5 and 6 (Figure 
1A). The efficiency gain in Muslim-led groups is large: minimum group effort increases by 1.07 hours, 
compared to the pre-leader average of 3.45 hours in periods 1 through 4 (Table 1, column 1).14 The 
estimates are robust to controlling for the demographic and religious characteristics of group 
members, consistent with our randomized assignment of leader identity (column 3). In contrast, the 
introduction of Hindu leaders does not improve minimum group effort (Figure 1A), leading to a 
statistically insignificant decline of 0.488 hours (Table 1, column 2). The difference in coordination 
 
14 The effect of Muslim leadership on minimum effort is lower than in the lab experiment of Brandts 
et al. (2015) who find that a randomly selected leader increases minimum effort from 3.33 to 11.25 
(using a rescaled measure for comparison purposes). The lower impact of leaders in our context could 
be due to differences in the context (developed country lab experiment vs developing country field 
setting) or because leaders in our experiment could only communicate a numerical proposal while 
those in Brandts et al. (2015) had the ability to send more detailed messages to participants.  
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gains between Muslim and Hindu leaders is statistically significant (column 5). Our results are 
consistent with a higher expected fraction of behavioral types among Muslims-- our model predicts 
that Muslim leaders will have a bigger impact than Hindu leaders under this situation. 
The results are robust to using town random effects instead of town fixed effects, using an ordered 
probit specification rather than OLS, and to controlling for town*mat fixed effects to ensure that 
participants are correctly responding to the effort choices of their firm members rather than the effort 
choices of those seated on the same mat during the experiment. In a post-game survey, we elicited 
each participant’s trust of people of the other religion by asking whether they would like to have a 
neighbor of a different religion. We find no evidence that our results are driven by differences in cross-
religion trust, see Appendix Table C1. 
6.3. Mechanism: Citizen Reactions to Leader Identity 
 Our model generates predictions based on individual responses to leader identity (among the 
“behavioral types”) and other players’ optimal strategies in light of these expected reactions. We show 
that our results cannot be explained by alternative hypotheses, such as the reactions to leader proposals 
or to the perceived competence of leaders. First, we verify that our results cannot be explained by 
differences in leader proposals. Our data reveal that Muslim leaders propose 10.5 hours on average, 
compared to 9.4 hours for Hindu leaders (Appendix Table A5). This difference is not statistically 
significant (Appendix Table A6, column 1), and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the 
distributions of proposals by leader identity are not statistically different (p value= 0.452; Appendix 
Figure A4). We confirmed that the significantly different results under Muslim leaders compared to 
Hindu leaders hold even when we control for leader proposals and for minimum effort in period 4 by 
restricting the sample to periods 5 and 6 (Table 1, column 6). Second, we find that our results are not 
driven by perceptions of higher competence of Muslim leaders, by greater or lesser exposure to real-
life Muslim leaders, or by beliefs about the hours worked by the leader (see Appendix Table A7).  
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We now show two pieces of evidence consistent with our theoretical framework. Our theoretical 
framework predicts that we should see increased effort in Muslim-led groups when 𝑝𝑎' is sufficiently 
greater than (1 − 𝑝)𝑎& . When is this more likely to happen? Based on previous research, we expect 
a lower fraction of Muslim behavioral type individuals (𝑎') in towns where Muslims form a higher 
fraction of the population, i.e. where 𝑝 is high. This means that the inequality is less likely to be satisfied 
when 𝑝 is very high or very low, and more likely to be satisfied at intermediate values of 𝑝. In Appendix 
Figure A5, we graph the increase in minimum effort under Muslim leaders against the town’s Muslim 
population share. The results are in line with this prediction, namely that towns with very high or very 
low Muslim population share show smaller increases. This is suggestive rather than conclusive as, with 
a small number of towns, the differences are not statistically significant.  
Importantly, we show that our results are consistent with the extent to which individuals expect 
others to react to leader identity. As part of the social norms task, we asked respondents to rate (on a 
scale of 1 to 4, with 4 being the highest) how “socially appropriate” others would consider it to be for 
a Hindu or Muslim employee to choose the maximum effort level under a Hindu or a Muslim leader. 
We find that Hindu subjects rate a maximum effort as less “socially appropriate” from a Muslim 
employee when faced with a Hindu leader instead of a Muslim leader, a statistically significant 
difference (Appendix Table A8, panel A).  In other words, Hindus expect Muslims to significantly 
change their behavior based upon leader identity. In contrast, Muslim employees do not expect any 
difference in effort from themselves under Hindu vs Muslim leaders. They do rate Hindus providing 
maximum effort under Muslim leaders to be less socially appropriate than under Hindu leaders, but 
the difference is not statistically significant (Appendix Table A8, panel B).  
Given this structure of beliefs, our model predicts that rational Hindu employees are much less 
likely to increase effort under Hindu leaders (since they are more likely to expect the Muslims to be 
“behavioral”), as compared to Muslim employees under Hindu leaders. The reverse is unlikely to be 
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true, since Muslim subjects do not assign a statistically different rating to Hindu employees’ 
appropriateness under different leaders. We can investigate these predictions by examining how 
individual effort decisions respond to leader identity: 
(5) 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡!-./ = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./ + 𝐺!-.0 𝑔 + 𝑤!-./; t = 1,2,…,6 
where IndividualEffortikjt is the effort choice of individual i in group k (of town j) and period t. As before, 
Gikj includes town fixed effects, demographic controls and religion, and standard errors are clustered 
at the group level. Note that individual effort choices depend not only on their expectations of how 
other individuals in the group will react to the leader’s proposal and the leader’s identity, but also the 
individual’s own reaction to leader identity (if they happen to be a behavioral type).  
Consistent with our model predictions, we find that Hindu employees show a decline in effort 
when a Hindu leader is introduced, while Muslim employees do not show any significant change in 
effort (Table 2, columns 1 and 2). The difference in response between Hindu and Muslim employees 
is significant at the 10% level. In contrast, Muslim employees exhibit a statistically significant increase 
in effort under Muslim leaders, while Hindu employees show a non-significant increase in effort (Table 
2, columns 3 and 4). However, the difference between Hindu and Muslim employee response to a 
Muslim leader is not statistically significant. To summarize, our investigations indicate that our main 
finding, that Muslim leaders induce greater coordination towards Pareto-superior equilibria, is 
primarily driven by citizen reactions that are shaped by expectations of Muslims having stronger in-
group bias (i.e., they are more likely to expect the Muslims to be “behavioral”). 
7. Coordination Responses to Leader Identity under Policy Assignment 
7.1. Regression Specification 
We examine whether leader effectiveness varies across policy environments by comparing 
coordination outcomes for a given leader identity across the different treatment groups as follows: 
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(6)	𝑀𝑖𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡-./=b0 +	𝛽*𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./+	𝛽(𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./*𝐴𝐴.+	𝛽"𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./*𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡.+
	𝑋-.0 𝛾	+ 𝜀-./  ; t = 1,2,…,6 
In equation (6), AAj is a dummy that equals one if town j was randomly assigned to the affirmative 
action treatment and Contactj equals one if the town was randomly assigned to the contact treatment. 
We estimate equation (6) separately for Muslim and Hindu leaders. 𝛽* then captures the impact of the 
leader on coordination in the control arm, 𝛽(  estimates the differential impact of the leader in an AA 
environment and 𝛽"  estimates the differential impact of the leader in an environment with pre-game 
contact between members of the different religions. 
7.2. Affirmative Action 
Our empirical results show that affirmative action (AA) policies, a commonly suggested solution 
to improve integration and opportunities for minorities, can in fact strongly reduce the effectiveness 
of minority leaders. Minimum effort increases by a statistically insignificant 0.227 hours (1.067-0.840) 
under Muslim leaders (Table 3, column 1). In contrast, minimum group effort increases by a large and 
statistically significant 2.391 hours under Hindu leaders (column 2).  
Our model suggests that this may result from an increase in the expectation that Hindus include 
behavioral types (𝑎&),	which would lead to increased minimum effort under Hindu leaders. This will 
be more likely to happen if 𝑎& increases so much that the sufficient condition for our hypothesis is 
reversed, i.e. (1 − 𝑝)𝑎& ≫ 𝑝𝑎' . Such a change in behavior is consistent with previous research which 
finds that AA policies result in a strengthening of in-group bias among AA non-recipients 
(Gangadharan et al., 2016 show this in the context of gender quotas in India). This effect is likely to 
be heightened in contexts where people believe that quota recipients are not suitable for leadership 
roles because they are less skilled or not truly disadvantaged (Ip et al., 2019). To investigate the 
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behavior of Muslim and Hindu individuals, we examine individual effort as a function of the religion 
of the group leader across different treatment arms:  
(7)	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡!-./=	𝑓1+	𝑓*𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./+	𝑓(𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./*𝐴𝐴.+	𝑓"𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟-./*𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡.+
	𝑋!-.0 g	+ 𝑧!-./  ; t = 1,2,…,6 
Our estimates show that Hindu employees chose significantly higher effort levels in Hindu-led groups 
under the AA treatment compared to the control group i.e. f2 > 0 (Appendix Table A9, column 4). 
The results are sharper when we restrict to periods 5 and 6, and include controls for the leader’s 
proposal and for minimum group effort in the pre-leader period, similar to columns 3 and 4 of Table 
3. We see that both Hindu and Muslim employees reduce effort under Muslim leaders in the AA 
environment compared to the control group (Appendix Table A9, columns 5 and 6). Similarly, both 
Hindu and Muslim employees increase effort under Hindu leaders in the AA environment (columns 
7 and 8). Though the change in effort is statistically significant only for Hindu employees, the fact that 
both types of employees’ effort choices move in the same direction is consistent with a generalized 
perception of greater  𝑎& and lower  𝑎' under AA. Note also that the higher response of Hindu 
employees to both Hindu and Muslim leaders is consistent with a greater fraction of behavioral types 
among Hindus under AA. 
As with the control group results, we verify that these differences do not arise because of 
differences in leader proposals across treatment arms. Muslim leaders do not make statistically 
different proposals from Hindu leaders across any of the treatment arms (Appendix Table A6, column 
2). To address the possible concern that the groups assigned to the different policy environments 
undergo different rates of learning over the course of the game, we restrict the estimation sample to 
the last two periods and control for leader proposals and minimum effort in the previous period of 
the game, period 4 (Table 3, columns 3 and 4). The concern is allayed, and the coefficients on 
Leader*AA are now statistically significant for both Muslim and Hindu leaders.  
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7.3. Intergroup Contact 
Another common policy to improve integration is to encourage contact and interaction between 
groups. We find that intergroup contact improves minimum group effort under both Muslim and 
Hindu leaders compared to the control group, but the difference is larger for Hindu leaders. For 
Muslim leaders, intergroup contact increases minimum group effort by an additional 1.007 hours 
compared to the control group, but this difference is not statistically significant (Table 3, column 1). 
Under Hindu leaders, intergroup contact results in a large and statistically significant increase of 2.755 
hours of minimum group effort, compared to the control group (column 2). This difference counter-
balances the better performance of Muslim leaders in the control group- minimum group effort in the 
contact treatment is almost the same across Muslim and Hindu leaders (see Figures 1B and 1C).  
This result in the context of our framework, corresponds to an increase in both 𝑎& and 𝑎' , and 
a particularly large increase in 𝑎& . In other words, both Hindus and Muslims are more responsive to 
leader identity after intergroup contact, but the effect is stronger for Hindu individuals. Examining 
potential mechanisms and in particular individual effort again, we find no significant increase in 
individual effort levels under Muslim leaders, but a strong and significant increase in individual effort 
for both Hindus and Muslims under Hindu leaders (Appendix Table A9, columns 5-8). Our results 
suggest that expectation of change in Hindu behavior after contact with Muslims is higher than the 
expectations of change in Muslim behavior after contact with Hindus. This asymmetry probably arises 
because Muslims are a minority community overall, and hence interactions with Hindus may be more 
common for them than the reverse. The mechanism our results indicate—namely the increase in 
identity-based response—is different from that emphasized in previous research on intergroup 
contact which has focused on whether such contact can reduce prejudice or affect attitudes such as 
pro-sociality, trust or egalitarianism (Rao, 2019, Finseraas et al. 2020, Paluck et al., 2018). 
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As before, we verify that leader proposals are not driving our results. We again find no significant 
differences in leader proposals under intergroup contact compared to the control group (Appendix 
Table A6, column 2). The coefficients of interest are larger in magnitude and statistically significant 
after controlling for leader proposals (Table 3, columns 3 and 4). In fact, once we control for leader 
proposals, the improvement in coordination in Muslim-led groups becomes statistically significant.15   
7.4. Does Conflict History Matter? 
The results discussed so far average across areas with different histories of Hindu-Muslim conflict. 
In this section, we examine how the relationship between coordination outcomes and leader identity 
varies in the control vs treatment arms with whether the district had high or low exposure to 
intergroup conflict over the period 1980-2010. This is pertinent since such policies may be 
implemented to ameliorate historical grievances. The aim of this exercise is not to compare outcomes 
in high and low conflict areas directly, since many other observable and unobservable characteristics 
may differ across high conflict and low conflict areas. Instead, we take advantage of the fact that we 
randomly allocated towns to different treatments within districts characterized by high vs low conflict 
and we compare behavior across these randomized treatments within each conflict setting. Thus, we 
do not aim to identify the causal impact of conflict history, but rather the casual impact of the two 
policies under Muslim vs Hindu leaders across areas with different conflict histories.      
We find a consistent pattern of results that suggest a lower responsiveness of Muslims to leader 
identity in high conflict areas, and a higher responsiveness of Hindus to leader identity in those same 
areas (Figure 3). In particular, we see that the increases in minimum group effort under Muslim leaders 
are uniformly higher in low conflict areas for all the three policy environments (see Table 4, columns 
 
15 The gender of an individual’s puzzle partner may also be important. We re-estimate equation (4) for 
the contact group participants, interacting leader with female puzzle partner. We find that participants 
with female puzzle partners respond less to the introduction of a leader, but the difference is not 
statistically significant (see Appendix Table C2).  
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1 and 2). In particular, this means that our earlier finding that Muslim leaders improve coordination 
in the control and contact treatments emerges mostly from low conflict areas (column 1), and there is 
a significant decline in coordination in the AA arm in high conflict areas (column 2). This is consistent 
with 𝑎' being uniformly lower in high-conflict areas. One reason for this may be that Muslims are 
less willing to exercise their religious preferences precisely because of the history of religious conflict, 
in which existing evidence suggests that they are usually the victims (Mitra and Ray, 2014). 
The impact of Hindu leaders on coordination is less sensitive to the history of conflict in the 
district, with the exception that coordination improvements in the contact treatment arm are in fact 
higher in high conflict areas (Table 4, columns 3 and 4). This is consistent with higher 𝑎& , potentially 
because of behavioral type Hindus reactions to leader identity being primed by intergroup contact in 
areas where religious tensions are stronger. Our earlier findings that Hindu leaders do not improve 
coordination in the control arm, but do improve it under both the AA and the contact treatments, 
holds in high and low conflict areas. All of these results are robust to controlling for leaders’ proposals, 
and therefore they are primarily driven by citizen reactions to leader identity (see Appendix Table C3). 
Overall, our results suggest that the prior history of intergroup conflict matters for the effectiveness 
of leaders as well as for the effectiveness of policies. Of particular policy relevance is the result that 
AA, which often aims to increase leadership roles for minorities, may in fact be detrimental for 
minority leader effectiveness. 
8. Conclusions 
We provide the first investigation of how leader effectiveness in achieving economic coordination 
in diverse societies varies with leader identity. We implemented a lab-in-field experiment in India’s 
largest state, where we randomly assigned towns to two policy treatments and a control group. The 
random assignment was stratified by district, to allow us to compare the impact of policy treatments 
across districts with a history of high vs low intergroup conflict.   
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We find that minority leaders improve coordination (measured as minimum group effort), but 
majority leaders do not. This is primarily the result of citizen reactions to leader identity, rather than 
differences in leader actions. The mechanism driving citizen reactions appears to be higher 
expectations of responsiveness to leader identity among members of the minority group.  In contrast 
to the greater responsiveness of Muslims to leader identity in the control group, we find that identity-
based responsiveness to leaders appears to increase for members of the majority group in the presence 
of policies designed to improve social integration of the minority group. In fact, the control group 
results are reversed under affirmative action that is perceived to assign leadership posts to Muslims, 
with coordination becoming higher under Hindu leaders. A policy of intergroup contact leads to 
higher coordination under all leaders, but the gains are larger under Hindu leaders. 
We find that social integration policies enable minority leaders to be more effective in low conflict 
areas. Specifically, in low conflict areas and only in low conflict areas, Muslim leaders serve to improve 
coordination outcomes in each of the three experimental arms. The effectiveness of Hindu leaders 
remains evident in the AA and contract arms but does not vary significantly by conflict history. 
Pulled together, our findings provide compelling evidence that social identity influences behavior 
in a way that leads to different economic choices than would emerge from maximization of individual 
economic payoffs. Our particular contribution is to demonstrate this in the context of leadership. We 
show that citizen reactions to leader identity influence coordination outcomes. In general, we find that 
the minority group shows stronger responsiveness to leader identity, except in areas with a history of 
intergroup conflict. However, policies designed to integrate minorities tend to activate social identity 
responses in the majority group in ways that can potentially reduce the effectiveness of these policies.  
Our findings contribute novel evidence to research on leader identity, coordination failure, social 
integration policies and religious conflict, bridging key aspects of these domains of research. They 
provide unique evidence on the role of citizen reactions to leader identity in heterogeneous 
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communities using a non-student sample. They further provide useful guidance for policy, identifying 
conditions under which leaders of minority vs majority groups may be constrained in resolving 
coordination problems.  
Our results suggest many directions for future research in field settings. These include allowing 
leaders to use unrestricted communications rather than specific proposals (as in Brandts et al., 2016), 
examining whether raising the monetary stakes or changing group sizes affects leaders’ effectiveness, 
and whether our results for Hindus and Muslims in India generalize to other social majority or 
minority groups. Some recent research suggests that social identity itself may be amenable to policy 
initiatives (Miguel, 2004; Blouin and Mukand, 2019). While this is beyond the scope of our paper, it 
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Figure 1
Leader Identity and Minimum Group Effort in Different Policy Environments
The figure shows the average minimum effort for groups with Muslim leaders and groups with Hindu leaders. Periods 1-4 are prior to 
leader assignment, periods 5 and 6 show outcomes after leader identity and leader proposals are revealed to participants.
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Figure 2
Leader Effectiveness Across Policy Environments and Conflict Histories
The figure shows the average minimum effort for groups with Muslim leaders and groups with Hindu leaders. Periods 1-4 are prior to 
leader assignment, periods 5 and 6 show outcomes after leader identity and leader proposals are revealed to participants.
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Table 1
Leader Identity and Minimum Effort (Control Group)
Dependent variable: Minimum Effort in the Group 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders All Leaders All Leaders
Leader (Period>4) 1.067 -0.488 1.067 -0.488 -0.488
(0.494) (0.381) (0.508) (0.392) (0.379)
Muslim Leader * (Period>4) 1.555
(0.620)
Muslim Leader -0.492 1.272
(0.616) (0.618)
Observations 246 246 246 246 492 164
R-squared 0.281 0.258 0.477 0.435 0.309 0.536
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religious Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experimental Controls No No No No No Yes
Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at group level. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and monthly household income; 
religious controls include dummies for whether the participant prays several times a day or once a day; experimental controls include the leader's 
proposal and the group minimum effort in period 4. Columns 1-5 include data from all periods; Column 6 is restricted to periods 5 and 6 only.
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Table 2
Leader Identity and Individual Effort (Control Group)









Leader (Period>4) 0.015 -1.156 1.157 0.377
(0.517) (0.408) (0.434) (0.531)
p-value (M employee = H employee)
Observations 486 480 486 498
R-squared 0.242 0.280 0.309 0.278
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religious Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hindu Leaders Muslim Leaders
Individual Effort
Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at group level. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and 
monthly household income; religious controls include dummies for whether the participant prays several times a 




Policy Environments and Leader Effectiveness
Dependent variable: Minimum Effort in the Group 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders
Leader (Period>4) b 1 1.067 -0.488
(0.495) (0.382)
Leader (Period>4)*AA b 2 -0.840 2.391 -1.625 2.370
(0.814) (0.671) (0.837) (0.627)
Leader (Period>4)*Contact b 3 1.007 2.755 1.738 2.850
(0.752) (0.651) (0.801) (0.676)
p-value for b 2  = b 3 0.034 0.634 0.000 0.476
Observations 774 768 258 256
R-squared 0.258 0.340 0.365 0.399
Town FE Yes Yes No No
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religious Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experimental Controls No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at group level. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and monthly household 
income; religious controls include dummies for whether the participant prays several times a day or once a day; experimental controls 
include the leader's proposal and the group minimum effort in period 4. Columns 1 and 2 include data from all periods; Columns 3 and 
4 are restricted to periods 5 and 6 only. Leader dummy is always equal to one in columns 3 and 4. 
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Table 4
Does a History of Conflict Matter for Leader Effectiveness  across Policy Environments?
Dependent variable: Minimum Effort in the Group 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslim Leaders Muslim Leaders Hindu Leaders Hindu Leaders
Low Conflict Areas High Conflict Areas Low Conflict Areas High Conflict Areas
Leader (Period>4) 1.181 0.978 -0.486 -0.489
(0.577) (0.770) (0.555) (0.537)
Leader (Period>4)*AA 0.757 -2.176 2.236 2.520
(1.194) (1.036) (1.020) (0.912)
Leader (Period>4)*Contact 2.014 0.320 1.663 3.470
(1.100) (1.027) (0.780) (0.939)
Observations 336 438 330 438
R-squared 0.417 0.282 0.401 0.328
Town FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religious Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at group level. Demographic controls include gender, age, education and monthly household 
income; religious controls include dummies for whether the participant prays several times a day or once a day.
